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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-4600 
_____________ 
 
NEW JERSEY PHYSICIANS, INC.;  
MARIO A. CRISCITO, M.D.; PATIENT ROE, 
          Appellants 
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PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES;  
SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES TREASURY;  
SECRETARY OF THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES;  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(Civil No. 10-cv-01489) 
District Judge:  Hon. Susan D. Wigenton 
 
Argued June 22, 2011 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, JORDAN, and GREENAWAY, JR. 
Circuit Judges.  
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(Filed: August 3, 2011) 
 
Robert J. Conroy (Argued) 
R. Bruce Crelin 
Kern Augustine Conroy & Schoppmann, P.C. 
1120 Route 22 East 
Bridgewater, NJ 08807 
 
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
 
Beth S. Brinkmann (Argued) 
Mark B. Stern 
Alisa B. Klein 
Dina B. Mishra 
Attorneys, Appellate Staff 
Civil Division, Room 7531 
U.S. Department of Justice 
950 Pennsylvania Ave. NW 
Washington, D.C. 20530 
 
Counsel for Defendants-Appellees 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal concerns a challenge to the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (referred to as the 
“Health Care Act” or the “Act”).  The plaintiffs object 
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primarily to the Act’s minimum essential coverage provision, 
more commonly referred to as the individual mandate.  The 
mandate, when it becomes effective in 2014, will require all 
non-exempt applicable individuals either to maintain a certain 
minimum level of health insurance or pay a monetary penalty.  
The plaintiffs’ complaint asserts, generally, that the entire 
Health Care Act is unconstitutional because the individual 
mandate exceeds Congress’s authority to pass laws.   
 
The District Court dismissed the complaint without 
reaching the merits of this challenge.  Rather, the District 
Court held that the plaintiffs failed to plead adequately injury 
in fact and, therefore, did not meet their burden to 
demonstrate standing.  The plaintiffs now appeal that 
determination.  For the reasons stated below, we will affirm.   
 
I. 
A. 
The plaintiffs are Mario A. Criscito, M.D., a licensed 
New Jersey physician, “Patient Roe,” a patient of Dr. 
Criscito’s, and New Jersey Physicians, Inc., a non-profit 
corporation that “has as a primary purpose the protection and 
advancement of patient access to affordable, quality 
healthcare.”  Appendix (“App”) 32a.  Dr. Criscito is the only 
member of New Jersey Physicians, Inc. identified by the 
plaintiffs in their pleadings.  The defendants are four 
governmental officials sued in their official capacities:  
President Barack Obama; Timothy Geithner, the United 
States Secretary of the Treasury; Eric Holder, the United 
States Attorney General; and Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services.  
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The complaint contains minimal allegations pertaining 
to the plaintiffs’ provision or receipt of health care.  The 
complaint alleges that Dr. Criscito “treats patients” “in the 
course of his individual practice of medicine,” and that 
“[s]ome of those patients pay [him] for his care and do not 
rely on a third-party payor to do so on their behalf.”  App. 
32a-33a.  The complaint also alleges that Roe “is a patient of 
Dr. Criscito who pays himself for his care” and that he “is a 
citizen of the State of New Jersey who chooses who and how 
to pay for the medical care he receives from Dr. Criscito and 
others.”  App. 33a.  Regarding New Jersey Physicians, Inc., 
the complaint asserts only that the organization’s “members 
and their patients will be directly affected by the legislation at 
issue [i.e., the Health Care Act] . . . should the [legislation] 
become effective.”  App. 32a.    
 
B. 
Only two sections of the Health Care Act
1
 are relevant 
to this appeal.   
 
The first is the previously mentioned individual 
mandate, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A.  When it takes effect in 2014, 
the mandate will require all “applicable individual[s]” to 
either obtain a level of health insurance that qualifies as 
“minimum essential coverage” or pay a penalty.  26 U.S.C. § 
5000A(a), (b), (c).  The Act defines an “applicable 
                                              
1
  Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as later 
amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation 
Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 142 Stat. 1029.   
 
5 
 
individual” to be any United States citizen, national, or 
lawfully present alien unless that individual has a valid 
religious exemption or is presently incarcerated.  26 U.S.C. § 
5000A(d).  Not all applicable individuals are subject to the 
individual mandate, however.  The Act exempts certain 
“applicable individual[s],” including those whose household 
income is insufficient to require them to file a federal income 
tax return, those whose premium payments exceed eight 
percent of their household income, and those who establish 
that the individual mandate imposes a hardship.  26 U.S.C. § 
5000A(e).  All non-exempt applicable individuals must 
comply with the individual mandate’s requirement and 
acquire “minimum essential coverage.”  This minimum 
essential health insurance coverage may be obtained in 
various ways, such as by enrolling in employer-sponsored 
insurance plans, individual market plans, or certain 
government-sponsored programs such as Medicare or 
Medicaid.  26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f).  
 
The second relevant provision is the employer 
responsibility provision, 26 U.S.C. § 4980H.  This provision 
only applies to “applicable large employer[s],” which are 
defined as employers that employ fifty or more full-time 
employees on average over a calendar year.  26 U.S.C. § 
4980H(c)(2)(A).  The employer responsibility provision 
penalizes such employers if they fail to offer their full-time 
employees the opportunity to enroll in an employer-sponsored 
insurance plan that satisfies the individual mandate’s 
minimum essential coverage requirement.  26 U.S.C. § 
4980H(a).
2
  Like the individual mandate, the employer 
                                              
2
  In addition, for an applicable large employer to be 
penalized, at least one of the employer’s full-time employees 
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responsibility provision will take effect in 2014.  26 U.S.C. § 
4980H(d). 
 
C. 
The plaintiffs initiated this action by filing a complaint 
in the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey on March 24, 2010.  On March 30, 2010, the plaintiffs 
filed their First Amended Complaint (referred to primarily as 
the “complaint” throughout).  The defendants challenged the 
plaintiffs’ invocation of the District Court’s jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and in an opinion dated 
December 7, 2010, the District Court granted the defendants’ 
motion to dismiss on the ground that it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction.  Specifically, the District Court held that all three 
of the plaintiffs failed to allege the requisite injury in fact and 
thus did not meet their burden to demonstrate standing.  The 
District Court’s opinion did not address the defendants’ 
alternative jurisdictional arguments or the merits of the 
plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge.  This timely appeal 
followed. 
 
 
 
 
II. 
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the 
jurisdiction of federal courts to the resolution of “[c]ases” and 
“[c]ontroversies.”  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.  “This language 
                                                                                                     
must receive a premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction 
through a health benefit exchange.  26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a). 
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restricts the federal judicial power to the traditional role of the 
Anglo-American courts” and thereby prevents courts from 
taking “possession of almost every subject proper for 
legislative discussion and decision.”  Ariz. Christian Sch. 
Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1441-42 (2011) 
(citations and quotation marks omitted).  “No principle is 
more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system 
of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-
court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”  Simon v. 
E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976).   
 
“Courts enforce the case-or-controversy requirement 
through the several justiciability doctrines,” which “include 
standing, ripeness, mootness, the political-question doctrine, 
and the prohibition on advisory opinions.”  Toll Bros., Inc. v. 
Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2009).  This 
appeal implicates standing, “[p]erhaps the most important of 
these doctrines.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  Standing “is 
every bit as important in its circumscription of the judicial 
power of the United States as in its granting of that power.”  
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of 
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 476 (1982). 
 
The three “irreducible” constitutional elements of 
standing are:  (1) an “injury in fact”; (2) “a causal connection 
between the injury and the conduct complained of – the injury 
has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not the result of the independent action of 
some third party not before the court”; and (3) a showing that 
it “be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury 
will be redressed by a favorable decision.”  Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) 
(alterations, citations, and quotation marks omitted).  The 
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only constitutional element at issue on this appeal is the first 
one – “injury in fact.”   
 
To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must allege an 
injury that is both (1) “concrete and particularized” and (2) 
“actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”  Id. 
(quotations omitted).  Each of these definitional strands 
imposes unique constitutional requirements.  An injury is 
“concrete” if it is “real,” City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 
102 (1983), or “distinct and palpable, as opposed to merely 
abstract,” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) 
(quotation marks and citations omitted), while an injury is 
sufficiently “particularized” if it “affect[s] the plaintiff in a 
personal and individual way,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1.  
The second requirement – “actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical” – makes plain that if a harm is 
not presently or “actual[ly]” occurring, the alleged future 
injury must be sufficiently “imminent.”  Imminence is 
“somewhat elastic,” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2, but requires, 
at the very least, that the plaintiffs “demonstrate a realistic 
danger of sustaining a direct injury,” Babbitt v. United Farm 
Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979) (emphasis 
added); see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2 (requiring that an 
imminent injury be “certainly impending” (quotation marks 
omitted)).  In other words, there must be a realistic chance – 
or a genuine probability – that a future injury will occur in 
order for that injury to be sufficiently imminent.
3
 
                                              
3
  The Supreme Court has indicated that there may be a 
temporal component to imminence’s probabilistic limitation.  
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 226 (2003) (holding that an 
alleged injury in fact that will not occur for at least six years 
“is too remote temporally to satisfy Article III standing”), 
9 
 
 
III. 
The defendants present a facial challenge to subject 
matter jurisdiction, contesting the sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ 
pleadings.  We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s dismissal on this basis, Common Cause of Pa. v. 
Pennsylvania, 558 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2009), accepting all 
allegations as true and construing those allegations in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiffs, see Gould Elecs. Inc. v. 
United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).
4
 
 
Only one of the three named plaintiffs must establish 
standing in order for a court to consider the merits of their 
challenge to the Health Care Act.  See Rumsfeld v. Forum for 
Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 
(2006).  Each plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating 
standing “with the manner and degree of evidence required at 
the successive stages of the litigation.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
561.  Accordingly, given the procedural posture of this case, 
“general factual allegations of injury resulting from the 
defendant’s conduct may suffice.”  Id.  Even at the motion to 
dismiss stage, however, “[i]t is a long-settled principle that 
standing cannot be inferred argumentatively from averments 
in the pleadings but rather must affirmatively appear in the 
record.”  FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231 
(1990) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  
Ultimately, “[a] federal court is powerless to create its own 
                                                                                                     
overruled on other grounds, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. 
Ct. 876 (2010).   
 
4
  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
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jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise deficient allegations of 
standing.”  Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155-56.   
 
IV. 
In light of the disposition below, the only issue before 
this Court is whether the plaintiffs have met their burden in 
pleading injury in fact.  We will assess the allegations 
relevant to each plaintiff in turn.  
 
A. 
The only allegations pertaining to any injury in fact 
suffered by Patient Roe are as follows:  (1) “Roe is a patient 
of Dr. Criscito who pays himself for his care,” and (2) Roe “is 
a citizen of the State of New Jersey who chooses who and 
how to pay for the medical care he receives from Dr. Criscito 
and others.”  App. 33a.  These allegations are factually barren 
with respect to standing.  The first apparently suggests that 
Roe pays for his own health care.  The second reveals only 
that, before Roe pays, he chooses his doctor and his method 
of payment.  It provides no specifics as to whom Roe chooses 
or how Roe pays. 
 
These allegations are insufficient to establish injury in 
fact.  First, Roe fails to set forth any current “actual” 
“concrete and particularized” injury.  There are no facts 
alleged to indicate that Roe is in any way presently impacted 
by the Act or the mandate.  This case is thus unlike some of 
the other pending health care challenges, in which the 
plaintiffs alleged or demonstrated that they were experiencing 
some current financial harm or pressure arising out of the 
individual mandate’s looming enforcement in 2014.  See 
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Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-2388, --- F.3d ----, 
2011 WL 2556039, at *3 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (“As to 
actual injury, the declarations of [two of the individual 
plaintiffs] show that the impending requirement to buy 
medical insurance on the private market has changed their 
present spending and saving habits.”); see also Liberty Univ., 
Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611, 624-25 (W.D. Va. 
2010) (“Presently felt economic pressure, like that Plaintiffs 
claim to experience from the employer and individual 
coverage provisions, may originate from a future event that is 
in some respects uncertain to occur.”).   
 
Second, Roe’s allegations do not establish that a future 
“concrete and particularized” injury is “imminent.”5  As an 
initial matter, the complaint is entirely silent as to whether 
Roe will be a non-exempt “applicable individual” subject to 
the mandate’s requirement to obtain “minimum essential 
coverage” in 2014.  This omission, taken in isolation, would 
not necessarily be fatal to the standing analysis if Roe was 
otherwise able to establish a “realistic danger” that he would 
be harmed by the individual mandate.  Roe, however, has 
alleged no predicate facts to demonstrate that his situation 
will even change when the individual mandate takes effect on 
                                              
5
  In so holding, we do not adopt the defendants’ argument 
that two related factors preclude individuals from relying on 
the individual mandate to establish imminent harm:  (1) the 
passage of time before that mandate will be enforced, and (2) 
the unpredictability that attends any such passage of time.  
According to the defendants, the plaintiffs must wait until 
shortly before the individual mandate’s 2014 effective date to 
file suit in order to establish the requisite “imminence.”  We 
question that reasoning and so do not rely on it. 
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January 1, 2014.  There is nothing inherent in the terms of the 
mandate that will alter Roe’s current reality, at least as that 
reality is set forth in the plaintiffs’ complaint.  Roe will 
continue to be free to choose “who and how” to pay for his 
health care needs, including by paying for those needs out of 
his own pocket.  The individual mandate may, of course, 
impact Roe depending on the precise “who and how” he 
chooses.  Absent more specific allegations, however, we 
simply cannot conclude on the record before us that there is a 
realistic danger or genuine probability that Roe will suffer a 
cognizable imminent injury resulting from the individual 
mandate.
6
 
 
B. 
The complaint is similarly deficient in regard to Dr. 
Criscito.  The only allegations pertaining to any injury in fact 
suffered by Dr Criscito are as follows:  (1) “Dr. Criscito, in 
the course of his individual practice of medicine, treats 
patients,” and (2) “[s]ome of those patients pay Dr. Criscito 
for his care and do not rely on a third-party payor to do so on 
their behalf.”  App. 32a-33a.  These allegations – as with the 
allegations pertaining to Roe – state very little:  only that Dr. 
Criscito, as a doctor, treats patients, and that some of those 
patients currently pay Dr. Criscito out of pocket.   
 
                                              
6
  This case is thus in contrast to Thomas More.  In that case, 
the plaintiffs demonstrated sufficient predicate facts to allow 
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit to conclude that 
“[t]he only developments that could prevent [an] injury from 
occurring are not probable and indeed themselves highly 
speculative.”  Thomas More, 2011 WL 2556039, at *4.   
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The plaintiffs argue that Dr. Criscito has (or will) 
suffer two kinds of injuries pursuant to these allegations.  
First, the plaintiffs maintain that Dr. Criscito will suffer an 
injury because “Dr. Criscito, as a citizen of the United States, 
will be subject to the individual mandate in the same manner 
and to the same extent as would Patient Roe.”  Pls.’ Br. 14.  
The plaintiffs, however, fail to meet their burden in 
demonstrating injury in fact pursuant to this theory for the 
same reasons just discussed with respect to Roe.  The 
complaint sets forth no facts to establish that Dr. Criscito is 
suffering or will suffer an actual or imminent “concrete and 
particularized” injury.   
 
Second, the plaintiffs posit that, “[i]n addition to this 
impact, as a physician, [the Health Care Act’s] provisions will 
have a direct, substantial impact upon Dr. Criscito’s medical 
practice, the manner in which he may, or may not, seek 
payment for his professional services and the manner in 
which he may render treatment to his patients.”  Pls.’ Br. 14.  
Again, the plaintiffs plead no facts in their complaint to 
buttress these arguments and thus prove nothing more than an 
impermissible “conjectural or hypothetical” injury in fact 
suffered by Dr. Criscito.   
 
The plaintiffs also do not plead any facts to 
demonstrate that Dr. Criscito will be injured by the Health 
Care Act’s employer responsibility provision, 26 U.S.C. § 
4980H.  As discussed above, this provision only applies to 
employers that have at least fifty full-time employees, and the 
plaintiffs’ complaint fails to specify how many employees 
work for Dr. Criscito.  Here, as with Dr. Criscito’s other 
theories of standing, the complaint fails to allege the 
necessary predicate facts.   
14 
 
 
C. 
Finally, there is only one relevant allegation pertaining 
to New Jersey Physicians, Inc.:  “[New Jersey Physicians, 
Inc.’s doctor-] members and their patients will be directly 
affected by the legislation at issue . . . should the [legislation] 
become effective.”  App. 32a.  In order to establish 
associational standing, however, an organization must “make 
specific allegations establishing that at least one identified 
member ha[s] suffered or would suffer harm.”  Summers v. 
Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009).
7
  Here, the 
only member of New Jersey Physicians, Inc. identified in the 
complaint is Dr. Criscito, and for the reasons just stated, the 
complaint fails to establish that Dr. Criscito has experienced 
any injury in fact.  Accordingly, the plaintiffs have failed to 
meet their burden in proving New Jersey Physicians, Inc’s 
associational standing.   
 
V. 
 For the reasons discussed above, the plaintiffs have not 
met their burden in pleading facts that establish the requisite 
                                              
7
  Additionally, “[t]here is no question that an association may 
have standing in its own right to seek judicial relief from 
injury to itself and to vindicate whatever rights and 
immunities the association itself may enjoy.”  Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975).   New Jersey Physicians, 
Inc., however, brings this suit only on behalf of its “members 
and their patients [who] will be directly affected by the 
legislation at issue.”  App. 32a. 
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injury in fact and therefore fail to demonstrate standing.  We 
will affirm.
8
 
 
                                              
8
  In affirming, we note that the District Court’s dismissal for 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction was by definition without 
prejudice.  Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 
182 (3d Cir. 1999).  The plaintiffs may thus pursue a new 
action and attempt to remedy the jurisdictional defects 
discussed in this opinion. 
